Professor Lorenzo Luisetto presented his paper, “Collective Bargaining and Monopsony: The Regulation of Noncompete Agreements in France,” at the 19th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (CELS) hosted by Georgetown University Law Center on October 24-25, 2025. 

CELS is an interdisciplinary gathering that draws empirical researchers from across the United States and the world, bringing together scholars in law, economics, political science, psychology, and other fields who are interested in the empirical analysis of law and legal institutions. 

In his paper, Professor Luisetto examines how the regulation of noncompete agreements for employees through collective agreements affects firm-level markdowns in the French manufacturing sector. A key takeaway is that, by enhancing compliance or imposing additional requirements for noncompete enforceability, collective bargaining serves as an effective tool to regulate the use of noncompete agreements in France.

The working paper can be found here: https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp2079.pdf

The full program of the conference can be found here: https://cels2025.com/